
But they do not supersede their predecessors. These patterns can bring out different features of a complex whole. Though they use data from more detailed sciences, they are themselves parts of social science - particular interpretative schemes using new selections from the data, new ways of viewing familiar facts. Their conclusions are not discoveries that can be reported objectively without involving conceptual changes. He reports their views as factual discoveries.īut cognitive science and evolutionary psychology are not physical sciences that could make this sort of claim. He offers them as the only proven theories, contrasted with primitive, disorganised "intuition" which is all anybody has used until now. He sees his favoured doctrines as science - respectable, ordered thinking, the only right way to go. "Pinker Two" relies heavily on a sharp, dramatic contrast between "science" and the rest of thought. If that is what we are, some people might wonder what has happened to the rest of our bodies? But the trouble goes deeper. The mental world can be grounded in the physical world by the concepts of information, computation and feedback. In the study of humans, there are major spheres of human experience - beauty, motherhood, kinship, morality, co-operation, sexuality, violence - in which evolutionary psychology provides the only coherent theory and has spawned vibrant new areas of empirical research. But we now know that the mind is not a homogeneous orb invested with unitary powers or across-the-board traits. Before the revolution, commentators invoked enormous black boxes such as 'the intellect' or 'the understanding', and they made sweeping pronouncements about human nature, such as that we are essentially noble or essentially nasty. It is now possible to make sense of mental processes, and even to study them in the lab. "Beginning in the 1950s, with the cognitive revolution, all that changed. These, he says, have freed us from our age-long ignorance. He offers just three lifelines: the "new sciences of the mind", cognitive science, behavioural genetics and evolutionary psychology. The trouble begins when "Pinker Two" starts to tell us how to understand this nature, now that we can believe in it again. That nature is, he says, a rich and legitimate heritage, not an extraneous tyrant.Īll this is surely fine indeed I have said much of it myself. Attacking the linked doctrines of empiricism ("the blank slate"), romanticism ("the noble savage") and dualism ("the ghost in the machine"), he urges us to accept realistically, in our theories as we do in everyday life, that much of our conduct and feelings are indeed rooted in the physical nature that is given to us, rather than coming from a mysterious entity called society or appearing from nowhere.
